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Analyses of nonproliferation have not tradition-ally focused on the possibility of war. Recent de-velopments, however, have led these two topics
to be linked more closely. As I write this in November
2002, a war initiated by the United States to change the
regime in Iraq appears all but inevitable. One of the pri-
mary reasons given for such a campaign is the need to
eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—
in essence, to move from nonproliferation to a very force-
ful form of counterproliferation. Pre-emptive action, to
use the parlance of the Bush administration, may well have
begun by the time this article appears in print. (Because
no final decision about whether to go to war has been
made public at the time of this writing, this article de-
scribes the Iraq debate in the present tense, as if further
deliberation might still occur. Although the outbreak of
war would affect how the article reads, it should not af-
fect most of the analysis that follows.)
Seen from one perspective, the move toward war is
an unexpected development. The U.S. Congress autho-
rized the use of force against Iraq in votes taken in Octo-
ber 2002, barely one year after the terrorist attacks
by al Qaeda on September 11, 2001. The threat posed
by al Qaeda led the United States to deploy military per-
sonnel to multiple countries, and even in Afghanistan their
mission was far from being completed one year later. With
so much still to do to disable al Qaeda, it is in one sense
surprising that the United States would consider mount-
ing another sizable military operation simultaneously in
the absence of an overt act of aggression by Iraq.
From another perspective, however, 9/11 made war
against Iraq more rather than less likely. As the quotes in
the box below indicate, 9/11 changed the way many
Americans view the world, making them more willing to
use force against a hostile country without waiting to see
whether that country would actually attack the United
States. The purpose of this article is to examine the rela-
tion of 9/11 to U.S. willingness to use military force to
remove Saddam Hussein from power in Baghdad. The ar-
ticle draws heavily on a theoretical approach in the study
of foreign policy that emphasizes the role of analogies to
important historical events. This “lessons of history” or
“analogical reasoning” approach incorporates findings
from cognitive and social psychology and highlights the
potential for analogies to earlier events to be misleading.
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The examination of 9/11’s impact that follows has
two major elements. First, I show that the apparent role
of 9/11 in convincing the United States to embrace the
option of a preventive war against Iraq fits quite well with
the expectations of the analogical reasoning approach to
explaining foreign policy. This article does not purport to
provide a full explanation of the U.S. willingness to take
military action against Saddam, as this would require con-
sideration of more than just psychological factors. But the
analysis here will suggest that adequate explanation does
require recognizing the cognitive impact—and also the
emotional impact—of a terrorist attack that killed 3,000
people. In particular, I emphasize the need to combine
such psychological factors with a broader domestic po-
litical analysis: while the impact of 9/11 on administra-
tion thinking is hard to ascertain, its impact on the public
and Congress is what made the most difference in chang-
ing U.S. policy.
Second, I argue that September 11 does not streng-
then the case for a preventive attack on Iraq as much as
many people seem to think. As suggested by the research
on analogical reasoning, some of the purported lessons that
people have drawn from 9/11 are probably misleading
when it comes to the case of Iraq. There are especially
reasons to question any conclusion that 9/11 proves that
Saddam would attack the United States once he improves
his WMD capabilities.
Overall, the analysis here does not lead to a final con-
clusion about whether the United States should or should
not go to war with Iraq (or have gone to war, if this is
being read after the fact). Determining the best policy
requires evaluating all of the arguments, pro and con, for
war and weighing these against the pros and cons of other
possible policy options. September 11 is only one element
in this larger assessment. The analysis here does indicate,
however, that 9/11 should not be the overriding consider-
ation in this larger assessment and that “the risks of inac-
tion,” to borrow a phrase from U.S. Vice President Dick
Cheney, might not be as great as they have been por-
trayed—in particular, deterrence is not as hopeless a task
as many now assume. Because many of the issues in the
Iraq debate are likely arise again in other contexts, such
September 11th changed the whole equation. Before then, an argument could be made that deterrence
worked.
— Former Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-NY), December 2001
If you take the analogy … as to what happened with bin Laden, we should have acted much sooner. He was
under indictment for killing Americans in Mogadishu, the embassy attacks. Now we have Saddam Hussein
thwarting the UN….
       — Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), August 25, 2002
Some have asked, “Well, what’s changed to warrant the action [against Iraq] now?” Well, what has changed
is our experience on September 11th. What’s changed is our appreciation of our vulnerability and the risk
that the United States faces from terrorist networks and terrorist states armed with weapons of mass destruc-
tion. […] what’s different is 3,000 people were killed….
    — Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, September 19, 2002
It has often been said that those who do not remember history are condemned to repeat it. Today, by passing
this resolution [authorizing use of force against Iraq], we are showing that we have learned the lessons of
World War II and September 11….
— Representative James Sensenbrenner (R-WI), October 7, 2002
Let me say … why I’ve decided to vote for this resolution. First, September 11 has made all the difference.
— Representative Dick Gephardt (D-MO),
then House Minority Leader, October 10, 20021
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as the effort to deal with the North Korean nuclear pro-
gram, it is important not to attach more weight to the
lessons of 9/11 than they deserve. Although this mon-
strous terrorist attack cannot and should not be ignored
in future policy deliberations, in order to evaluate better
the relevant lessons and when they apply, it is important
also to keep in mind both other historical cases and the
best-supported findings of scholarly research.
A CONTEXT FOR EVALUATING THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF 9/11
Before discussing the possible impact of September 11 on
Americans’ perceptions of Iraq, a prior question should
be addressed: Is it even necessary to consider psychologi-
cal factors to explain U.S. policy toward Iraq? There are
many possible explanations for foreign policy decisions,
and consideration of the alternatives might obviate any
need to examine the role of 9/11. In particular, any dis-
cussion of a decision to use force should consider the pos-
sibility, which has long been a staple of the traditional
realist school of thought, that an objective threat to secu-
rity has prompted the decision. There are certainly good
reasons to regard Saddam Hussein as a threat, including
his past willingness to use force and his likely possession
of biological and chemical weapons and well-documented
pursuit of nuclear weapons. From this perspective, one
could argue that the threat from Saddam is so obvious
and imminent that the United States has no choice but
to use military force as soon as possible. If this is the case,
then there is no need to probe deeper, and the possible
influence of 9/11 becomes superfluous.
However, there are good reasons not to regard the
threat from Saddam as by itself sufficient to explain U.S.
policy. Two observations show that, before Congress voted
in mid-October 2002 to authorize use of force, the situa-
tion did not appear so clear-cut as to generate consensus
that the United States had to act militarily. First, the UN
inspection regime in Iraq collapsed in 1998. Yet four years
elapsed before the United States began seriously contem-
plating using force to bring about change inside Iraq. If
any efforts by Saddam to reconstitute his WMD capabili-
ties were too dangerous to tolerate, why was it not until
2002 that the United States became willing to mount an
invasion to remove this threat? The delay between the
end of inspections and the move toward military action
suggests the timing of this policy shift might provide clues
to the reasons for the policy change.
Second, if realists are the most likely to focus on se-
curity threats and consider them grounds for using force,
it is noteworthy that many prominent realists publicly dis-
agreed with the administration’s approach to Iraq. For
example, Brent Scowcroft, who served as national secu-
rity advisor to the first President Bush at the time of the
1991 Gulf War, came out against war with Iraq as the de-
bate began to heat up in summer 2002. Most of the lead-
ing realists in the academic field of security studies also
indicated they opposed war with Iraq, including in a
signed advertisement on the New York Times op-ed page.
These realists argued that the risks that would accompany
military action in Iraq outweigh the risks of not acting
militarily at this time. They pointed to several possible
dangers. War in Iraq might deflect attention and resources
away from the fight against al Qaeda. The war might de-
stabilize Arab regimes that have supported the United
States or convince more Muslims that the United States
opposes Islam, thereby leading more of them to embrace
terrorism. And an effort to remove Saddam from power
might actually prompt him to use his available WMD.2
Future developments might make it appear obvious,
in retrospect, which side was correct. But it was not so
obvious ahead of time as to generate consensus prior to
the start of congressional debate in fall 2002. Consider-
able uncertainty about the threat posed by Saddam and
the consequences of a war meant that reasonable people
could and did disagree. Given the extent of uncertainty
and disagreement, explaining U.S. policy requires identi-
fying the factors that tilted the debate in favor of support
for war in the near term. This is especially so because U.S.
culture has historically emphasized using force only in
response to aggression by others, so that a policy of pre-
emption had to overcome traditional reluctance to think-
ing in such terms. For example, in response to an even
greater threat in the Cuban missile crisis, President John
F. Kennedy ruled out a pre-emptive air strike in part be-
cause he viewed launching a surprise first strike as incon-
sistent with U.S. moral values.3
When a situation is ambiguous, people’s existing be-
liefs and concerns are likely to shape how they interpret
that situation. In the issue under discussion here, an ap-
proach emphasizing such cognitive factors could be ap-
plied to two relevant sets of actors: the administration
and the rest of the country. Cognitive approaches typi-
cally focus on top decisionmakers. In this case, this would
involve analyzing what convinced President Bush and
the majority of his foreign policy advisors to put regime
change in Iraq at the top of their agenda.
To give a convincing cognitive account of the
administration’s decisionmaking would require overcom-
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ing two obstacles that are beyond the capabilities of the
analysis here. First, there are other potential explanations
of the administration’s policy, especially to the extent that
one believes the objective case for taking military action
right away is not completely convincing. Some hypoth-
esized motivations reflect domestic economic or political
considerations. To critics on the left, the energy industry
ties of President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick
Cheney suggest the administration is really seeking to se-
cure Iraq’s oil for U.S. companies. The timing of the con-
gressional debate, less than a month before midterm
elections, also prompted suspicions that the administra-
tion was trying to divert voters’ attention away from a
faltering economy so as to improve Republicans’ electoral
prospects. (Of course, the timing of the congressional vote
could have been cynically chosen without the decision
to use force itself being electorally motivated.)
Because the current president’s father, George H.W.
Bush, was president at the time of the Gulf War and chose
not to march on Baghdad at that time, there has also been
a natural tendency to speculate that personal motivations
might explain the younger Bush’s focus on Saddam. The
current president has mentioned Saddam’s alleged
attempt to assassinate his father as a reason to take ac-
tion.4  And some have suggested that, whether out of loy-
alty or a desire to prove himself better than his father,
George W. Bush might feel highly motivated to complete
a job that, according to hawks, his father left unfinished.
Any attempt to use cognitive factors to explain the
administration’s decision to give priority to forcing regime
change in Baghdad must control for these other possible
explanations and weigh these potential domestic and per-
sonal motivations against the lessons drawn from 9/11 or
other experiences. Dealing with this first difficulty in
evaluating the role of cognitive factors in administration
policy is not feasible at this time because of a second ob-
stacle. To trace how an event affects the thinking of top
officials, ideally one would need to interview those indi-
viduals and examine the records of their internal policy
deliberations. Without access to decisionmakers and the
minutes of their meetings, determining whether analogi-
cal reasoning played a role in their policy choices becomes
nearly impossible. For these reasons, this article does not
attempt to determine the exact mix of factors that shaped
administration policy. Below, I note some reasons why “les-
sons of 9/11” might have played a role in the president’s
thinking, but I leave the task of further analysis to future
historians who have access to the necessary evidence.
THE NEED TO BRING IN DOMESTIC POLITICS
Although the president is the most influential actor in
U.S. foreign policy, nevertheless on most issues the presi-
dent cannot carry out policy on his own. Whether ad-
ministration policy is being driven purely by officials’
assessment of the Iraqi threat, or has also been influenced
by the pursuit of oil or by domestic political or personal
considerations, the administration would find it difficult
to fight a war if it lacked support elsewhere in the U.S.
political system. The U.S. constitution mandates that only
Congress can authorize war (except in cases of repelling a
sudden attack), and congressional control of the purse
strings means that, even if the administration had chosen
to use force without congressional authorization, it would
still have had to convince Congress to fund the effort. In
addition, since Vietnam, the U.S. military has expressed a
clear desire to know the country strongly supports a war
before the military goes into action. For these reasons, the
administration ultimately concluded that it had to ob-
tain a vote from Congress and high levels of support in
opinion polls if it wanted to continue confronting Saddam
with a possible U.S. attack.
This conclusion suggests it is worth considering the
psychological impact of 9/11, not on the administration,
but on the rest of the country. In doing so, it is necessary
to combine such analysis with some approach that sug-
gests how lessons drawn from an event might factor into
domestic political dynamics. I propose using an approach
known as the “garbage can model.” This model challenges
the usual notions of sequence in policymaking. In an ideal
rational process, a problem emerges, and then people iden-
tify possible solutions and choose the best one. The gar-
bage can model assumes instead that people often have
policy proposals to which they are committed, and when
new problems arise they promote their proposal as a pos-
sible solution. In this view, problems and solutions are like
separate streams, and an appropriate window of opportu-
nity has to open up before a given problem and a particu-
lar solution get combined and rise to the top of the
agenda.5
Consideration of garbage-can dynamics is appropri-
ate in this case because some influential figures, of whom
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz is probably the
most prominent, actively asserted the need to take action
against Saddam Hussein long before 9/11. For hawks on
Iraq, September 11 created a window of opportunity to
promote their case both to the rest of the administration
and to the country at large. Some long-standing propo-
51
JEFFREY W. KNOPF
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002
nents of forcefully removing Saddam have openly sug-
gested this is the case. In the House floor debate on
the resolution to authorize use of force, Rep. Dana
Rohrabacher (R-CA) declared: “It is long past the time
when we should have finished the job. But it wasn’t until
9/11 that the American public would support the mili-
tary commitment necessary….”6
But something is also missing in such a garbage-can
account. If a terrible disaster or crisis like 9/11 opens a
window in which policy change is possible, this still does
not explain why a particular solution is the one that be-
comes linked to the new problem that rises on the agenda.
If there is more than one plausible option, an event like
9/11 can do more than open a window for policy change;
reactions to that event can also tilt the substantive de-
bate, making some policy proposals seem inherently more
or less persuasive than others.
In this case, there was more than one plausible op-
tion. The United States could have chosen to pursue a
more concerted effort at containment and deterrence,
supplemented by revamped sanctions and inspections.
Moreover, given the great uncertainties involved in any
foray into war, the fact that containment and deterrence
were quickly and sweepingly dismissed can fairly be seen
as puzzling. The quotes presented in the box above sug-
gest 9/11 is the key to this puzzle. But why would a hor-
rific event like this cast such a shadow over a seemingly
unrelated policy decision?
 “LEARNING”7  FROM HISTORY: WHY PEOPLE
USE ANALOGIES, WHICH ANALOGIES THEY
USE, AND HOW THEY APPLY THEM
Whenever there is a significant failure or disaster, it is
natural to try to learn lessons from that event that could
help prevent a repeat of the catastrophe. Those who study
the cognitive processes by which people make decisions,
including foreign policy decisions, warn that the natural
desire to learn lessons in such cases can have unfortunate
consequences. The point should not be overstated; It is
still important to learn as best we can what practical steps
might avoid or minimize disasters. But there are risks in-
volved in efforts to learn that must be kept in mind as
well. We are all familiar with Santayana’s famous maxim
that those who do not remember the past are condemned
to repeat it. As Robert Jervis points out, however, those
who do remember may be inclined to make the opposite
mistake.8
To understand how the memory of a previous inci-
dent can be misleading, it helps to understand why
cer tain past experiences strongly influence future
decisionmaking. The underlying problem is the gap be-
tween the complexity of reality and the capacity of the
human brain. Human beings operate under “bounded ra-
tionality”; they strive to make rational decisions, but there
are limits on people’s ability to process all the potentially
relevant information. At the same time, many important
situations involve uncertainty and value tradeoffs. Un-
certainty can exist because some vital information is not
available (how close is Saddam to obtaining nuclear weap-
ons?), because available information is ambiguous (to what
extent are Baghdad and al Qaeda cooperating with each
other?), or because people do not know for sure how to
bring about a desired outcome (can deterrence keep Iraq
from using WMD?). Most decisions also involve difficult
tradeoffs (should the United States act unilaterally even
if this weakens the United Nations and international law,
or should it support the rule of law even if this lengthens
the time it takes to eliminate certain threats?).9
When people must decide what to do about a prob-
lem and they do not have the time or ability to answer all
the uncertainties and fully weigh all the tradeoffs, they
tend to rely on certain rules of thumb or “heuristics.” In
foreign policy, one common heuristic is to make an anal-
ogy to an earlier international event and to apply the les-
sons of that event to the situation at hand.
Individuals do not typically have a large repertoire of
possible analogies on which to draw: people either do not
know or do not easily recall every event in history that
might be relevant. Instead, people generally think in terms
of only a handful of past cases, and these will not be a
random or representative sample of past events. Candi-
date analogies usually involve cases that made a deep im-
pression. Most analogies are therefore made to traumatic
events that had important consequences for one’s own
country. Recent events and events that occurred during
one’s formative years, as well as events in which one played
a personal role, are the most likely sources of foreign policy
lessons.10  Some past events that marked an entire gen-
eration also continue to exert influence because of teach-
ing and other forms of socialization. This helps explain
why references to Hitler, appeasement, and “lessons of the
1930s” have been ubiquitous in the Iraq debate.
Although individuals often have only a few cases
firmly implanted in their memories, they still have to de-
cide which one best applies to a case at hand. Some re-
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search suggests the choice can be affected by purely su-
perficial similarities between the two cases. For example,
lessons taken from the Korean War influenced decisions
about Vietnam because both cases involved a non-com-
munist, Asian “South” fighting a communist “North.”11
There can be some variation in how strongly indi-
viduals are affected by an event and in the nature of the
lesson they draw from that event. People who did not al-
ready have extensive knowledge or well-developed belief
systems regarding international affairs are likely to be more
strongly influenced by a dramatic new development. In
such cases, the lessons learned can create new beliefs or
change prior inclinations. In other cases, learning can re-
inforce existing beliefs;12  people become more confident
in the correctness of an opinion they hold and attach even
greater priority than before to acting on that belief. And
in all cases, learning tends to be filtered through existing
beliefs. Thus, different people can draw different lessons
from the same event: for example, hawks and doves in-
ferred different lessons from both the Cuban missile crisis
and the Vietnam War. 13
According to Yuen Foong Khong, reasoning by anal-
ogy can influence six tasks associated with policy choice.
Analogies can be used to define the nature of the situa-
tion or problem; indicate the stakes involved; suggest
possible solutions; evaluate the probability of success of
different options; assess the morality of a given policy;
and warn of the possible risks of a policy choice. Reflect-
ing the recent influence of social constructivist theories
in international relations, Christopher Hemmer suggests
analogies can sometimes do more than imply what is the
best policy choice. In some cases, the lesson of an event
can also lead people to re-define what they believe is in
the national interest.14  In other words, besides helping
people evaluate which policy will best advance a given
interest, a past experience can change what people think
is in their interest.
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF 9/11
Applying these insights of the cognitive approach, it can
be seen why 9/11 was likely to have a powerful influence
on subsequent foreign policy debates. At the same time,
thinking about why 9/11 had so much impact also reveals
a limitation of the cognitive approach: it does not ad-
equately take into account the emotional impact of events.
On the first point, some of the factors that encourage
analogical reasoning seem likely to apply to President
Bush himself. Before running for president, George W. Bush
had shown little interest in and gained almost no experi-
ence in foreign affairs. He also focused mainly on his do-
mestic agenda after entering the White House. Although
he clearly had certain underlying instincts about how to
handle foreign policy and a few strong commitments, such
as to missile defense, the president was still largely a nov-
ice in this area, meaning his foreign policy belief system
was unlikely to be fully formed. Thus, the Qaeda attack
came when the president’s beliefs were still at a formative
stage, and obviously President Bush played a personal role
in formulating the U.S. policy response. This suggests that
whatever lessons he learned from 9/11 would play a pow-
erful role in President Bush’s thinking about other for-
eign policy problems.
Any attempt to identify the lessons Bush learned is
necessarily speculative, but there are enough clues to en-
able some plausible suggestions. First, the president clearly
began with an instinct to favor hardline stances on for-
eign policy. Since any interpretation of 9/11 would be fil-
tered through this underlying predisposition, 9/11 was
likely to have reinforced the inclination to adopt hawk-
ish postures in dealing with international disputes. Sec-
ond, President Bush had also previously shown great
concern about the dangers posed by the so-called rogue
states. Especially in arguing for the importance of missile
defenses, Bush and his advisors had frequently said they
doubted that deterrence would work against rogue states.
Again, September 11 was likely to reinforce these beliefs,
strengthening the conviction that deterrence is ineffec-
tive against such states and heightening the perception
that these states pose an imminent threat. Finally, and
perhaps most clearly, 9/11 seems to have altered President
Bush’s view of the importance of national security issues
on his agenda. Many stories have reported that the presi-
dent had not been highly focused during his first months
in office and that the war on terrorism has provided him
with a sense of mission.15
September 11 is less likely to have had a strong cog-
nitive impact on Bush’s top foreign policy advisors be-
cause these individuals already had highly developed
foreign policy beliefs. As noted, some influential admin-
istration officials had long argued for removing Saddam
from power. For these Iraq hawks, 9/11 served more as a
window of opportunity for making their case to the coun-
try. If President Bush had not previously been convinced
of the need to take preventive action against Saddam,
however, the likely effects of 9/11 described in the previ-
ous paragraph would have made him highly disposed to
find the hawks’ arguments persuasive. More subtly, learn-
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ing from 9/11 might also have contributed to what
decisionmaking theorists call cognitive closure. In other
words, once President Bush made up his mind about Iraq,
it was likely to stay made up; should anyone seek to bring
up new arguments against going to war, the president
would be disinclined to re-open the debate about whether
to attack Saddam in part because one lesson he might
have drawn from 9/11 is that the country should not al-
low any doubts to delay the use of force when it appears
necessary.
As one moves out from the administration, the cog-
nitive effects of September 11 are likely to have been
much greater. In Congress, many members have served
only in the post-Cold War period. Those who came to
Washington as part of the 1994 Gingrich revolution, in
which Republicans gained control of the House, typically
had little experience or interest in foreign affairs; in con-
trast to the internationalist Republicans of the Cold War,
they evinced more isolationist attitudes.16  For some mem-
bers of Congress, the war on terrorism is probably the first
serious international issue they have had to address. It
would thus not be surprising if 9/11 became a lens through
which they now looked at other foreign policy debates as
well.
Finally, for much of the public, the impact was likely
to have been profound. Americans can and do pay close
attention to foreign policy when they think it important:
in the early 1980s, for example, opinion polls found high
levels of concern about defense spending, nuclear weap-
ons, and Central America.17  Thereafter, however, Ameri-
cans had shown little interest in international issues,
especially after the Cold War ended. Foreign and defense
issues barely came up in the 1996 and 2000 presidential
campaigns, and media coverage in the summer before
9/11 focused almost entirely on a missing congressional
intern and a series of shark attacks. Many ordinary Ameri-
cans probably had little knowledge about Osama bin
Laden and no highly integrated belief system concerning
terrorism, WMD, or the Middle East. The lessons they
drew from 9/11 could thus become a central organizing
principle in how they view national security issues in gen-
eral.
This analysis still does not explain why Iraq specifi-
cally would emerge as a focus for newfound concerns about
U.S. security. The cognitive literature implies that surface
similarities between Iraq and al Qaeda would make Iraq a
focus of special concern. Some similarities do exist:
Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden are both Arab,
both Muslim, and both based in the Middle East. This
has apparently led some Americans to blur Iraq and al
Qaeda into a single, undifferentiated enemy. When a
weekly paper in my area asked people on the street whether
it is necessary for the United States to invade Iraq, one
person responded: “Yes it is. […] Make sure we get ’em.
You don’t want them to come back and do again what
they did in New York.”18  Most Americans, though, pre-
sumably know the difference between the two actors.
What has made Saddam appear so threatening as of 2002
is most likely a similarity to bin Laden at a more abstract
level: as President Bush has repeatedly stated, both are
evil. This implies an assumption that all evil individuals
will act alike, meaning the analogy creates an expecta-
tion that Saddam will act on his hatred for the United
States in the same way that bin Laden did.
In this case, though, a purely cognitive account of
Americans’ changing willingness to attack Iraq is seriously
deficient. This makes it sound as though 9/11 is just a lens
people use to impose a clear picture on an ambiguous re-
ality. But this overlooks the degree to which people have
become highly motivated to identify and act proactively
on potential security threats. This motivation derives at
least partly from the emotional impact of 9/11. This at-
tack killed thousands and destroyed important symbols
of American accomplishment. It was aimed at all Ameri-
cans. And, unlike Pearl Harbor, it occurred in a media age,
so that everybody saw the images of the attack repeatedly.
As a result, the attack aroused powerful feelings, such as
anger, fear, and grief. This emotional residue, as much if
not more than the cognitive effects of 9/11, is what made
the putative lessons of 9/11 so salient and effective in
mobilizing the public and Congress to support a possible
preventive attack on Iraq.
In recent years, some international relations special-
ists have argued for paying more attention to the role of
emotions, and not just cognitions, in foreign policy-
making.19  The obvious emotional impact of 9/11 makes a
case for doing this specifically in theories that emphasize
the role of lessons of history. Analogies can be important
not just because they seem to clarify the uncertainties in
a situation, but also because they can have an emotional
resonance that gets people to set aside doubts or accept
risks that might otherwise dissuade them from acting.
The various cognitive effects emphasized in the ex-
isting literature can also be seen at work in this case how-
ever. For example, 9/11 seems important to how individuals
clarify the moral issues, as Khong has suggested. With the
advantage of hindsight, many people now believe a pre-
emptive attack on al Qaeda would have been justified.
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This helps them overcome qualms they might once have
had about the moral legitimacy of preventive attacks in
other situations.
Before assessing whether the lessons of 9/11 really
apply to the Iraq case, it is important to note that not all
Americans have been persuaded that 9/11 makes the case
for a policy of pre-emption. Although, as of fall 2002, polls
found a majority of Americans support President Bush on
Iraq, the trend—at least before the UN Security Council
passed a new resolution that could authorize the use of
force—was toward increasing opposition: between Au-
gust and late October, opposition to use of force rose from
about 20 percent to about 33 percent in a Pew poll, while
support fell to 55 percent.20  In Congress, about one-quar-
ter of the legislature also voted against authorizing an in-
vasion. Surveys also found that support drops off if the
United States has to act on its own and that many sup-
porters of war still feel unease over its potential conse-
quences.21  Thus, while there is majority support for war,
in many quarters it is far from enthusiastic.
Overall, this suggests that 9/11 helped convince many
Americans to let the president try doing things his way,
but it did not lead them to give the Bush administration a
blank check. In other words, the U.S. public has not
achieved cognitive closure on this issue. It seems likely
that public attitudes could still be affected by new evi-
dence bearing on either the necessity of war or the effec-
tiveness of the administration’s policy. Potentially, if such
an analysis has not already been overtaken by events, a
further analysis of the implications of 9/11 could also fac-
tor into the public’s deliberations.
THE DANGERS OF ANALOGICAL REASONING
Although it is important to learn from past experience,
there are inherent risks involved in trying to apply the
lessons learned. Decisionmaking theorists have identified
three potential pitfalls in reasoning by analogy.22  First, an
individual might draw an incorrect lesson from the origi-
nal case. If one’s analysis of what policies or actions would
have worked better in the earlier situation is not valid,
then attempting to apply the lessons inferred to a later
case is not likely to produce a good result.
Second, a new situation can differ in important ways
from an earlier case to which it is being compared. If one
overlooks those differences but they are relevant to why a
certain policy worked or would have worked in the ear-
lier case, then that policy might not be successful if it is
applied to the new case.
A third problem is similar but more insidious. Indi-
viduals tend to ignore baseline information when they
draw lessons from a case. In other words, there are many
potentially relevant cases that could provide evidence
about what is likely to happen in a given type of situa-
tion. But if people base their predictions about a new case
on an analogy to just one past case, that particular case
could be atypical. If so, that analogy would provide a mis-
leading estimate of the most probable outcomes.
In the following sections, I take up each of these po-
tential dangers in turn, discussing whether they limit the
appropriateness of applying lessons of 9/11 to the Iraq case.
After this assessment, I consider other ways in which les-
sons of 9/11 might bear on the Iraq debate that differ from
those emphasized in the cognitive literature.
Did People Learn the Wrong Lesson?
Answering this question requires ascertaining what les-
sons people actually learned from 9/11. Although I have
found no comprehensive survey data on this question,
there is still sufficient evidence to reach some conclusions.
Reading through congressional debate, media interviews
with members of the public, and letters to the editor in
various newspapers, one theme clearly dominates: the
United States should have acted sooner. As one Nebraska
resident interviewed by the New York Times put it, “Sep-
tember 11 showed us we can’t sit on our duff”23 ; the quote
from Senator Specter in the box above shows that law-
makers drew the same conclusion.
Although people usually do not specify what action
they have in mind, it seems clear that they mean to imply
the United States should have sent military forces into
Afghanistan before 9/11—and in particular, the United
States should have used much more force after the 1998
embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. If the goal was
to prevent al Qaeda from attacking the U.S. homeland,
this seems to be a valid conclusion. Once al Qaeda ex-
isted and had targeted the United States, it is hard to see
how the United States could have forestalled every pos-
sible Qaeda attack without using military force against
Qaeda’s bases of operations. Thus, as a lesson about what
could have prevented an attack like 9/11, it is hard to dis-
pute the conclusion the United States should have acted
more vigorously sooner. If there is a problem in applying
lessons of 9/11 to the Iraq debate, the problem is not that
people have drawn an incorrect lesson from the earlier
case.
It is possible to question, however, whether the no-
tion “we should have acted sooner” is the only valid les-
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son of 9/11. Rather than focusing only on whether people
draw an incorrect conclusion from a past case, studies of
analogical reasoning should also consider whether people
tend to focus only on one lesson to the exclusion of other
relevant lessons. This would be consistent with the
premise of bounded rationality: because thinking simul-
taneously about three or four lessons is hard, individuals
may choose just one lesson on which to act. Because learn-
ing is filtered through existing beliefs (as well as underly-
ing psychological needs or motivations), the selection of
which lesson to emphasize could lead to a one-sided or
biased policy. The problem would not be that the lesson
is wrong, but rather that acting exclusively on that lesson
leads to a policy that ignores other relevant lessons and
thereby diminishes the chances of success.
Readers can probably come up with several other plau-
sible lessons of 9/11 besides the advisability of acting
sooner, but I will focus on one that seems especially rel-
evant to the Iraq debate. The history of al Qaeda suggests
that the ability of terrorists to find shelter and new re-
cruits varies to some extent with developments in the
Middle East region. Without getting bogged down in the
simplistic and misleading debate over whether the terror-
ists hate America for what it is or for what it does—why
can’t both be true?—it is clear that at times the United
States has pursued its goals in ways that, even if this is not
the intent, nevertheless have a negative impact on some
residents of the Middle East. To the extent the United
States acts in ways that reinforce its negative image among
Arabs and Muslims, it increases their willingness to pro-
vide al Qaeda with money, shelter, or recruits. Thus, an-
other potential lesson of 9/11 is that if the United States
could defend its interests in ways that do not add to the
anger or hatred others feel towards America, this would
reduce the likelihood of future terrorism.
This lesson has potentially different implications for
the Iraq debate than the lesson that implies the United
States should not wait until others attack it. If a U.S. at-
tack on Iraq is perceived in the region as proof the United
States really does oppose Islam, or as evidence the United
States has ulterior motives such as desire to dominate the
Middle East oil supply, then it could increase sympathy
for al Qaeda and make it harder to win the war on terror-
ism. People rely on analogies in part to resolve value
tradeoffs, but if an earlier case holds more than one lesson
and these lessons point in opposite directions, the tradeoff
problem can re-emerge. It is still better to recognize both
implications of an earlier case however than to focus only
on one lesson to the exclusion of the other. In weighing
these potentially contrasting lessons, the key question is
whether the Iraq case is actually similar enough to 9/11
that the first lesson—“we should have acted sooner”—
applies equally to the case of Saddam.
Does the Lesson Apply to Iraq?
The warning in the cognitive literature that people might
have inferred an incorrect lesson from an earlier case does
not seem applicable here. If the Iraqi threat were the same
in its essential features as the Qaeda threat, then it would
be reasonable to apply the lessons of 9/11. But is Iraq re-
ally similar in the relevant considerations?
As noted above, certain similarities do make the anal-
ogy seem plausible. The actors in both cases come from
the Middle East and have expressed tremendous hostility
toward the United States. Both have showed no com-
punctions about killing large numbers of civilians: as ad-
vocates of war against Iraq have frequently noted, Saddam
used chemical weapons (CW) not only against Iranian
forces in the Iran-Iraq War but also against Kurdish vil-
lages within Iraq. In applying lessons learned from 9/11
to Iraq, however, the most prominent characteristic com-
mon to both cases is summed up by the single word “evil.”
Because of the atrocities they have committed, both
Saddam and bin Laden must be considered evil men. Thus,
people have been confronted with an apparently com-
pelling syllogism: if one evil Middle Eastern fanatic who
hates America has attacked the U.S. homeland, then it is
likely the Iraqi dictator who shares these characteristics
will also strike the United States if he gets the opportu-
nity.
This conclusion is not as convincing as it initially
appears. Despite some similarities between the two cases,
there are also fundamental differences. Most important,
al Qaeda is a terrorist network while Iraq is a state. This
means there are differences in both the motivations of
Saddam and bin Laden and in the possibility of deterring
them. Al Qaeda is not tied to any piece of territory and
does not care about defending any territorial borders. If
terrorists lose a base of operations, they will try to melt
away and re-establish themselves elsewhere or even move
to a decentralized, loosely networked mode of operations
that does not require controlling any territory. Further-
more, achieving their extremist ideological objectives
overrides all other considerations for Qaeda operatives,
including their own survival. The 19 hijackers on Sep-
tember 11 chose to commit suicide. When terrorists are
willing to welcome death if it makes them a martyr for
their cause, they are obviously very hard to deter. Indeed,
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not only was al Qaeda not deterred by the possibility of
retaliation, its plan seems to have been to provoke such
retaliation. Osama bin Laden wanted to goad the United
States into military action in an attempt to prove his con-
tentions that America is an enemy of Islam and seeks to
dominate the Middle East.
Saddam Hussein’s situation is very different. Saddam
is the ruler of a state and has influence over others only
by virtue of being a state leader. Territory is therefore es-
sential to him. If he ceases to control Iraqi territory, he
becomes nothing. Moreover, Saddam’s primary goal is to
maximize his personal power, with the secondary goal of
creating a dynasty he can pass on to his sons. He is a spec-
tacularly brutal dictator, but he is not especially ideologi-
cal. The threat he poses is an old-fashioned kind: a lust
for power so great it leads to an expansionist program for
his state. Despite a very real animus toward the United
States, he is not so fanatically devoted to any abstract
cause that he would sacrifice his grip on power or his own
life to advance that cause. Because of these differences
between a terrorist leader and a despotic state leader,
Saddam is in theory at least still potentially deterrable.
He does not want the Iraqi state to lose control of its ter-
ritory, he does not want to lose his personal power over
that state, and he does not want to lose his life, not even
in a martyr’s death. If he knew he were likely to lose all of
these things if he attacked the United States or its allies,
by the logic of classical deterrence theory he should be
deterred.24  The only reason to doubt this would be if 9/11
provides empirical evidence that requires us to revise or
abandon traditional deterrence postulates. Does it?
Does the Lesson Ignore Baseline Evidence?
It is common to hear that September 11 “changed every-
thing.” Specifically with reference to Iraq, Defense Sec-
retary Rumsfeld has said those who question the need for
war “are thinking back in the 20th century,” while 9/11
shows 21st century threats will be completely different.25
Cognitive theories of decisionmaking suggest such con-
clusions may be unwarranted. When individuals reason
by analogy, they focus on the implications of just one case,
the case to which they are making an analogy. But there
are often other relevant historical cases. If one had knowl-
edge of all the analogous cases, one could calculate a sta-
tistical baseline estimate of the probability that some given
outcome would result in a similar, future case. When
people consider just one prior case, they ignore these
baseline probabilities.
Rumsfeld’s claim that 20th century evidence is irrel-
evant can be evaluated in part by seeing whether one can
identify past cases that are similar in their relevant fea-
tures to the present-day Iraqi case. In fact, multiple time
periods involving four different countries share essential
features with the case of Saddam in 2002. The strongest
fear expressed in the Iraq debate has been that deterrence
might fail to the extent that Saddam would launch a sud-
den “bolt from the blue” WMD attack on the United
States or one of its allies. At various times in the past,
similar fears were expressed for quite similar reasons about
four countries: the Soviet Union, China, North Korea,
and Iraq itself. The outcomes of these past cases provide
no basis for believing that deterrence is likely to fail to
such a catastrophic extent with Saddam, although they
cannot be taken to imply a 100 percent guarantee of suc-
cess either.
Several periods in U.S.-Soviet relations involved con-
cerns quite similar to those expressed in the 2002 Iraq
debate, but did not end in deterrence failures. The late
1940s and early 1950s set the prototype. Although
Saddam has often been compared to Hitler, the Soviet
dictator of that period, Josef Stalin, is a more apt analogy.
Saddam has studied Stalin’s career and sought to imitate
the Soviet dictator, a fact President Bush emphasized in a
speech to the nation on October 7, 2002.26  Given the
widespread concern about Stalin and Soviet intentions
after World War II, during the period when the United
States had an atomic monopoly (1945-1949), a number
of journalists, intellectuals and military officers advocated
attacking the Soviet Union before it could develop its own
nuclear weapons. Their reasoning, more than 50 years
ago, now sounds strikingly contemporary. As Marc
Trachtenberg summarized it, in an article that well pre-
dates 9/11, “In the late 1940s and well into the early 1950s,
the basic idea that the United States should not just sit
back and allow a hostile power like the Soviet Union to
acquire a massive nuclear arsenal … was surprisingly wide-
spread.”27  In the end, though, the United States chose
not to attempt a preventive attack before the Soviet
Union crossed the nuclear threshold.
In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s first atomic
weapon test in fall 1949, the U.S. government re-assessed
the country’s national security situation. In April 1950,
the famous document known as NSC-68 summarized the
conclusions. NSC-68 estimated that within four years,
unless the United States dramatically improved its mili-
tary capabilities, a Soviet nuclear buildup would lead to a
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situation in which the Kremlin might reasonably hope to
win a war, and this would create a strong possibility the
USSR would launch a surprise atomic attack at that time.
Although NSC-68 remained classified, its drafters briefed
sympathetic journalists on the main conclusions, leading
to public warnings that 1954 would be a year of “maxi-
mum danger.”28
Stalin died in 1953 without ever launching the “bolt
from the blue” attack American officials feared, and 1954
also passed largely without incident. It is hard to know
whether this outcome resulted because Soviet leaders
never contemplated launching a nuclear Pearl Harbor in
the first place or because, implementing the advice con-
tained in NSC-68, the United States initiated a defense
buildup that deterred the Soviet Union. Either way,
though, the relevant lesson is the same: even a monstrous
tyrant like Stalin will not automatically attack the United
States with weapons of mass destruction just because he
has the ability to do so, at least not when the United States
has a credible deterrent posture.
The Khrushchev years represent a similar case. These
years involved public scares about an alleged “bomber gap”
and later a supposed “missile gap.” Khrushchev’s behav-
ior accentuated these fears. Actions like banging his shoe
on a desk at the UN and declaring “we will bury you” gave
rise to doubts about Khrushchev’s mental stability and,
hence, whether he could be deterred. Khrushchev did
bring about an incredibly dangerous crisis by trying to in-
stall missiles in Cuba, but there is no evidence the Soviet
leader ever came close to ordering an unprovoked surprise
nuclear attack on the United States or its allies. And he
also backed down when confronted with firm opposition
to putting missiles in Cuba.
Dire warnings about what the Soviets might do arose
again in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when conserva-
tive defense analysts forecast an impending “window of
vulnerability.” Once again, there are no indications the
Soviets actually contemplated attacking the United States
at this time, and, like old generals, talk of a window of
vulnerability just faded away. Collectively, these Soviet
examples show that, however totalitarian and morally
despicable a U.S. adversary might be, it will not necessar-
ily strike the United States with WMD just because it has
the ability to do so. Either being evil does not by itself
imply a desire to use WMD, or else states led by brutal
dictators can still be deterred.
China under Mao fits the same pattern. Mao fre-
quently claimed that nuclear weapons would not be deci-
sive in warfare and that he considered the United States
a mere “paper tiger.” Such comments raised doubts about
whether Beijing actually understood or feared the conse-
quences of nuclear war. Hence, as the Chinese nuclear
program neared fruition, U.S. officials actively debated
whether to “strangle the baby in the cradle” by launching
a preventive strike. Several years later, the Soviet Polit-
buro also gave serious consideration to a preventive at-
tack against China’s nuclear sites. Ultimately, both
countries held back and China successfully entered the
nuclear club.29
The Cultural Revolution prompted renewed doubts
about whether Mao was actually a rational actor who
could be deterred. As a result, when Defense Secretary
Robert McNamara announced in 1967 that the United
States would start building an anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
system, he portrayed defense against Chinese missile at-
tack as a major goal of the proposed system.30  But the
United States soon abandoned the goal of a nationwide
ABM system, a posture it maintained for the next few
decades. Despite the absence of effective U.S. missile de-
fenses, Mao and his successors proved quite capable of
appreciating the logic of deterrence and the feared Chi-
nese attack never materialized.
When one considers some of the other arguments
about why Saddam poses a unique danger, the extent of
the parallels between Saddam’s Iraq and the Soviet Union
and China becomes even clearer. Supporters of war against
Iraq often describe at length, and in stomach-churning
detail, the many ways in which Saddam has brutalized his
own people.31  If the other two cases are not comparable,
however, it is only because they are even worse: Stalin
and Mao were both responsible for the deaths of millions
of their fellow countrymen. Another common argument
about why Iraq poses a threat is that Saddam has used
CW and violated agreements by maintaining covert
WMD programs. Similarly, there were many allegations
(though never conclusively proven) that the Soviet Union
used chemical weapons,32  and the Soviets definitely vio-
lated the Biological Weapons Convention on a massive
scale.33  In addition, advocates of removing Saddam point
out that he has previously used force against his neigh-
bors and seemingly still harbors territorial ambitions in
Kuwait. Stalin also used force against the Soviet Union’s
neighbors, and Communist China in the past swallowed
up Tibet and fought a war with Vietnam, and it still openly
seeks to regain what it considers the “renegade province”
of Taiwan. Despite all their similarities to Saddam’s dicta-
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torship, given the likelihood of a forceful U.S. response,
neither the USSR nor the PRC, both of which were much
more powerful than Iraq, ever directly attacked the United
States or sought to enable a proxy to strike the U.S. home-
land.
North Korea provides another, more contemporary
case that shares important features with the Iraq case. The
behaviors of the Stalinist dictators who have ruled North
Korea, first Kim Il Sung and now Kim Jong Il, have led
outsiders to question their rationality. Because the state
and its leaders have been so isolated from the outside
world, it has been possible that North Korean leaders
would not receive the feedback necessary to correct any
misperceptions they might have—and this has also been
a source of concern about Saddam. Also like Iraq, North
Korea has pursued policies that have imposed great suf-
fering on its people and has a past history of aggression
against a neighbor, in this case South Korea. And, as a
final parallel, North Korea has violated arms control agree-
ments.
North Korea provoked a serious crisis in 1993 when
it rejected requests for inspections to verify its compli-
ance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) and threatened to withdraw from the
NPT. The resulting dispute nearly led to war, until a visit
to North Korea by former President Jimmy Carter made
possible a compromise agreement. Despite the serious pos-
sibility of finding itself at war, and notwithstanding some
rather chilling threats it issued, North Korea did not
launch any attack using its WMD. 34  However, as
Pyongyang publicly acknowledged in fall 2002, the coun-
try did proceed to build a uranium enrichment plant that
at minimum violated the spirit of the 1994 agreement that
ended the earlier crisis.35
In 1998, North Korea again rattled nerves when it
launched a rocket on a trajectory over Japan. After the
ensuing outcry, however, North Korea halted further mis-
sile flight-testing, at least through late 2002. Finally,
Pyongyang’s October 2002 admission it had violated the
1994 Agreed Framework produced a new crisis. Although
this crisis is still unresolved as of this writing, the Bush
administration has so far not made any claims that North
Korea is likely in the near future to try to use WMD against
U.S. interests—even though it has argued this is a real
threat in the similar case of Iraq. North Korea is a genu-
inely challenging and dangerous problem for the outside
world, but neither its history to date nor the U.S.
administration’s most recent statements provide any ba-
sis for concluding that evil and isolated dictatorships, as
soon as they are able to, will use WMD against the United
States or its friends.
Finally, Iraq’s own past behavior is telling. In the Iraq
debate, supporters of war have frequently noted that
Saddam actually has used CW in the past. But he has only
ever done so against victims who could not launch a dam-
aging strike against Iraq in response. Saddam has never
used WMD against any state that could strike back with a
nuclear, biological, or chemical attack of its own. Because
of their concerns about what Saddam might do in a con-
flict, shortly before the 1991 Gulf War, both Israel and
the United States communicated veiled but pointed warn-
ings that Iraq would suffer terrible consequences if it used
CW against coalition forces or the state of Israel. Although
Saddam had more extensive chemical, biological, and
missile capabilities in 1991 than in 2002—and Iraq was
actively at war, not in the condition of cold peace punc-
tuated by occasional bombings that followed the
ceasefire—Iraq refrained from using WMD.36
The reasons for this restraint remain debated by out-
side analysts, but all of the plausible explanations lead to
a conclusion that Saddam can be deterred if he thinks
restraint will not endanger his regime’s survival. Most
experts believe Saddam was deterred from chemical or
biological attacks by the threat of nuclear retaliation: if it
worked in 1991, then why would it fail to work later?37
Others suggest that he was deterred by the expectation
that using WMD would lead to a conventional invasion
to remove him from power, but if this is correct the key
point is still that Saddam proved deterrable.
The cases just summarized comprise all the cases I
could think of that share most of the essential features
cited as reasons why Saddam might not be deterred from
using WMD. They provide the best available baseline, at
least prior to 9/11, for estimating the likelihood that
Saddam would initiate a surprise WMD attack. These
cases provide empirical evidence that past leaders who
have been brutal, isolated, and possibly irrational have
still been deterrable. Taken as a whole, the historical record
suggests there is almost no chance that Iraq would, out of
the blue, launch unconventional weapons against the
United States or one of its friends or allies. In practice,
this probably overstates the reliability of deterrence. There
are good reasons to believe that some residual risk of de-
terrence failure always remains, but the greatest risks in-
volve accidents, hasty responses to false warnings,
inadvertent escalation, or other scenarios that involve
some loss of control over events. A deliberate WMD at-
tack by a country that is not itself already under attack,
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launched purely for reasons of malice or hate, is the least
likely scenario for a deterrence failure. In this respect,
states—even states led by vicious dictators who have a
lot of blood on their hands—are still different from ter-
rorists.
An Alternative Scenario: Deterrence Failure
Involving Conventional Arms
There is a more limited but more plausible scenario for
deterrence failure. Kenneth Pollack has argued that once
Saddam Hussein has nuclear weapons, he might regard
them as a shield that would deter the United States from
fighting another Gulf War, thus making it safe for him to
resume aggression against his neighbors using conven-
tional forces.38  This is a valid concern, but with respect
to the focus of this article it is important to note two
points.
First, this argument has nothing to do with the les-
sons of 9/11. It is not based on the premise that the Qaeda
attack shows that those who hate America will not hesi-
tate to strike the U.S. homeland. Pollack’s argument flows
entirely from an analysis of the Iraqi dictator’s own psy-
chology and past behavior. Thus, this argument is entirely
consistent with the main point of this article, which is
that 9/11 is not as strong an argument for preventive ac-
tion against Saddam as participants in the Iraq debate
have suggested.
Second, if this type of deterrence failure is the real
concern, there might still be viable alternatives to imme-
diate invasion. For example, the United States and other
countries could tailor a deterrent message to this specific
scenario and take additional steps to make it credible. For
a start, this would involve telling Saddam clearly and re-
peatedly that any Iraqi use of force against one of its neigh-
bors, including a conventional assault, will immediately
result in pre-emptive strikes against suspected Iraqi WMD
sites followed by an invasion to remove him from power.
A UN Security Council resolution that pre-authorized
such a response would be one way to make this deterrent
threat more credible. However, the bottom line is that
the Pollack scenario is more plausible than the oft-cited
worry that Saddam will initiate another 9/11, only involv-
ing WMD, and as such it is appropriate to take it into
account in deliberations about how to deal with Iraq.
IS THE BASELINE IRRELEVANT?
Although Secretary Rumsfeld’s sweeping dismissal of 20th
century experience, quoted above, overstates the case, he
and other supporters of preventive war still have good rea-
son to suggest 9/11 changed some things. In particular,
9/11 demonstrated the potential of global terrorist net-
works to strike the United States. This draws attention to
the possibility that states and terrorists who share an en-
mity for the United States might choose to work together.
And this creates an alternative reason why deterrence
might fail. Thus, Secretary Rumsfeld’s testimony empha-
sized a concern that if states “transfer WMD to terrorist
groups they could conceal their responsibility for attacks
on our people.”39  If a chemical or biological agent were
delivered via ballistic missile, it would be possible to de-
termine the sender’s return address and that sender would
have to anticipate retaliation. But if terrorists smuggle a
bomb into the country and then set it off, it might be much
harder to determine the original source of that weapon. If
a state thinks it could, by using terrorists, execute an at-
tack without revealing where the attack came from, it
might believe it could evade triggering a U.S. response
and therefore no longer be deterred.
This is a serious argument that cannot entirely be dis-
missed, but it is not as compelling as it appears at first
glance. To assess the possibility that Saddam might launch
a WMD attack using al Qaeda as the delivery vehicle, as
it were, there are at least three relevant questions. First, is
there really no past evidence that bears on this assessment?
Second, how likely are Saddam and al Qaeda to work to-
gether this closely? And third, how likely is it that Saddam
will believe he could get away with such an attack suc-
cessfully?
On the first point, the 21st century world is not as
completely new as the Defense Secretary implies. There
have been past state sponsors of terrorism that also pos-
sessed WMD. For much of the Cold War, the United States
accused the Soviet Union of supporting various terrorist
groups around the world. Although the USSR had exten-
sive nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities and a
desire to neutralize or destroy U.S. power, so far as we know
it never shared any of its WMD stocks or know-how with
terrorists. The United States has similarly long listed North
Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, but Pyongyang has
never provided any terrorist group with the means to carry
out a WMD attack. Another case is Iran, which is the
primary supporter of Hizbollah. Despite their close asso-
ciation, Iran has not shared whatever WMD capabilities
it possesses with the anti-Israel militants it supports. Fi-
nally, Pakistan also provides a relevant example. Although
Islamabad gave assistance to Islamic militants in Kash-
mir during the same years it was achieving atomic weap-
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ons capability, the Pakistani government has shown ev-
ery sign of wanting to be sure its nuclear arms do not fall
into the hands of militant groups. There is thus a modest
body of relevant evidence, and it does not suggest much
inclination on the part of states to share WMD with ter-
rorists, even terrorists a state directly supports in other
ways.
The second question is primarily a matter of intelli-
gence assessment and cannot be answered with great con-
fidence here. Based on what has been reported publicly
by the U.S. government, it appears likely that there have
been contacts between Iraqi officials and al Qaeda, but
the evidence does not indicate an extensive working re-
lationship. Indeed, the Defense Department took the un-
usual step of setting up its own intelligence group to review
the data collected on Iraq because it was frustrated that
CIA analysis did not support administration contentions
about the level of Qaeda-Iraqi cooperation.40  This sug-
gests the existing evidence falls far short of the proverbial
“smoking gun,” but the fact that any contacts between
Saddam and al Qaeda have been observed is nevertheless
a cause for concern.
It is also unclear how interested the two actors would
be in an alliance. On the one hand, the old adage that
“the enemy of my enemy is my friend” provides an obvi-
ous motivation for them to consider working together. On
the other hand, Iraq’s Ba’athist regime has good reason to
fear al Qaeda’s intentions. Osama bin Laden and his fol-
lowers seek to rid the Middle East of secular regimes, in-
cluding Saddam’s; their ultimate objective in 9/11 was to
set in motion a chain of events that would result in the
overthrow of existing Arab governments by Islamist
forces. Aware of al Qaeda’s intentions and wishing to hold
on to power, Saddam might be wary about providing the
terrorist network with WMD capabilities that they could
employ against his own regime and not just the United
States.
Another limitation on the possibility of an alliance
is that Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden are in an
important respect direct rivals. Each aspires to be seen as
the symbolic leader and chief spokesperson for the entire
Arab world. Given that there can only be (at most) one
pan-Arab leader of this kind, it is unlikely either indi-
vidual would want to help the other elevate his standing
in the eyes of the Arab masses.
Finally, the possibility that the source of an attack
might not be discovered is not by itself sufficient to lead
to the breakdown of deterrence. Saddam would have to
estimate the odds of escaping detection as sufficiently high
that he would be willing to take the risk. The most opti-
mistic deterrence theorists think that even the slightest
uncertainty about getting away with an attack will lead
to deterrence: a state will not take any action that could
conceivably lead to nuclear retaliation against it.41  This
view is overly rosy. Saddam is a risk-acceptant actor who
is prone to misperception and miscalculation. Saddam’s
propensity for risk-taking and miscalculation does not
make an open attack on the United States likely, because
Saddam still surely understands that this would mean the
end of his regime. But it is conceivable that he might be
tempted to try to do something sneaky.
Because his driving ambition is to maintain and in-
crease his power, however, Saddam is likely to consider,
however roughly, the possible consequences of his actions.
To choose to aid a terrorist attack, Saddam would have to
estimate the chances of not leaving his fingerprints on
the operation as at least moderately good, or else the risk
of retaliation would be too great. At the same time, he
will obviously be put at or near the top of the suspect list
if there is any WMD attack on the United States or a U.S.
ally. It is quite possible the United States will not require
unambiguous evidence of responsibility before it responds.
Thus, even the possibility of leaving ambiguous evidence
creates a real risk of putting Saddam’s regime in the U.S.
crosshairs. Indeed, Saddam could realistically be worried
that even if someone else carries out a WMD terrorist at-
tack, he will get the blame and suffer the consequences.
He thus has some level of motivation to try to ensure such
an attack does not occur.
In addition, the notion that 9/11 shows how the 21st
century world is different looks at only one implication of
the terrorist attack. Yet 9/11 also held potential lessons
for other states and not just the United States. On the
one hand, as the U.S. administration has emphasized,
9/11 showed the existence of shadowy global terror net-
works that could be used by a state to deliver an attack.
But the U.S. response also showed other states the risks
that they take if they do ally with terrorists. Despite
Taliban protestations that the United States had not pre-
sented any proof of al Qaeda’s responsibility for the at-
tack, the United States responded quickly and decisively
in Afghanistan and easily swept away the Taliban regime.
The U.S. campaign in Afghanistan showed both the over-
whelming superiority of U.S. military capabilities and the
country’s resolve to hold states responsible if they pro-
vide support to terrorists. Far from proving the irrelevance
of deterrence in the 21st century, September 11, by provoking
the U.S. response it did, actually strengthened the deterrent
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message to states that might aid or harbor terrorists. Be-
cause of the U.S. operation in Afghanistan,
9/11 probably made Saddam less willing to work with
terrorists rather than more tempted to do so.
Lastly, the argument that Saddam would use a terrorist
network to deliver an attack neglects the question of what
benefits Saddam would see in such an attack. The Iraqi leader
hates America and would undoubtedly take pleasure in any-
thing that inflicted pain on the U.S. people. But it is not
obvious that he would accept the private pleasure of know-
ing he had caused U.S. suffering while somebody else re-
ceived the blame (or, in his eyes, credit) for doing it. Given
Saddam’s regional ambitions, his greatest motivation for
striking the United States would be to be seen doing it, so he
could present himself to the rest of the Arab world as the
only leader willing to stand up to the U.S. hegemon. But any
attempt to take credit for an attack on the United States—
whether openly or through indirect hints—would guaran-
tee a response that ends Saddam’s regime. In short, the more
likely it is that an attack would bring benefits that Saddam
would care about, the more certain it is that that attack would
prompt a forceful and determined U.S. response. It is thus
still possible to exert some deterrence against the form of
cooperation with terrorists that would be most attractive to
Saddam. This analysis all assumes, however, that Saddam
believes he can stay in power if he does not defy U.S. deter-
rent warnings. If Saddam believes an invasion is coming no
matter what, he may decide he has nothing to lose and so do
exactly what the United States has feared.
The United States and the international community
are right to worry about the possibility a state might share
WMD with terrorists; the possibility cannot be ruled out.
But an attempt to reason from 9/11 to determine the likeli-
hood of such an incident is likely to be misleading. The risk,
while real, is far from a certainty and not necessarily beyond
the reach of deterrence.
OTHER EFFECTS OF 9/11 ON HOW PEOPLE
THINK: ALTERED PRIORITIES AND
HEIGHTENED SENSITIVITY TO LOSS
The cognitive literature has generally assumed that les-
sons of the past affect policy choices by influencing how
individuals define a situation and the interests at stake
and how they evaluate which policies are likely to work
and which to fail. This assumes the primary difficulty in
responding to a new situation is the ambiguity of that situ-
ation: individuals therefore rely on a historical analogy
to resolve some of their uncertainty about the issue
be fore them. In addition to uncertainty, however,
decisionmaking also involves tradeoffs. Choosing a course
of action requires people to weigh competing values. And
if people change the weight they attach to different val-
ues, their overall priorities can change as a result. In short,
learning from a past event could have a significant im-
pact on how people rank their value priorities as well as
on their purely cognitive images of reality. Clearly, this
seems to have been the case with 9/11. The greatest im-
pact of September 11 has probably been to change the
willingness of many Americans to live with the risk of
terrorist attack and the costs they are willing to pay to
reduce that risk.
Previous sections have shown that applying the les-
sons of 9/11 to Iraq under Saddam ignores important dif-
ferences in the two situations. In particular, the risk that
deterrence will fail, leading to a WMD attack on U.S. soil,
is still fairly low. But the risk is not zero; some possibility
of such an attack exists. And after 9/11, even a very small
risk of suffering another attack is no longer acceptable to
many Americans.
Government officials are even more risk averse than
the public, because they know that they will be blamed if
a future attack takes place after they refrained from tak-
ing an action that could have prevented it. Senator Larry
Craig (R-ID) acknowledged as much during congressional
debate on the resolution authorizing use of force against
Iraq: “Many senators, and I’m one of them, have asked
how September 11 could have been prevented…. Today
we much ask ourselves, in the future do we want, once
again, to pose the same question that has now haunted us
for over a year?”42  For members of Congress and the ad-
ministration, the impact of 9/11 on their personal beliefs
is reinforced by a calculation that the political risks of
any military actions they approve are less than the risks
of failing to initiate military action should it later turn
out that preventive action was necessary.
This political calculus is a good barometer of how the
value priorities of the U.S. public have changed. Before
9/11, it is almost unimaginable that the majority of Ameri-
cans would have approved a preventive war. They would
have sought to avoid the casualties and possible adverse
international reaction, unless they were presented with
definite proof that an enemy attack was imminent. With
a much lower tolerance for risk, many people in the
United States are now willing to pay a higher cost to elimi-
nate potential threats.
This change in value priorities is partly a cognitive
change: Americans have learned the potential costs of
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not acting before a terrorist attack takes place. But this is
another area where it is hard to ignore the emotional im-
pact of 9/11. Americans did not just receive new informa-
tion that led them to update their images about what the
world is like. They also felt, as New York Mayor Rudy
Giuliani so memorably put it, that the number killed in
the attack was “more than any of us can bear.” Desire not
to see more Americans killed or again to feel such an-
guish has provided powerful motivation for individuals
to change their value assessments so that they no longer
consider preventive attacks to be an unacceptable viola-
tion of traditional U.S. values.
When analogies are used for predictive purposes, it is
usually possible through examination of empirical evi-
dence to critique the application of a given analogy, ex-
actly as this article did above. Value judgments, in contrast,
are more subjective and thus harder to critique on em-
pirical grounds. In a democracy, if citizens want to make
eliminating potential terrorist threats a higher priority, it
is their right to make this choice, and indeed it would be
unwise for the U.S. public not to take this threat seriously.
However, it is still possible to note a couple caveats that
apply to the 9/11-induced shift in value priorities.
First, because of human psychology, individuals might
accept a level of cost and risk to eliminate threats to secu-
rity that, with the advantage of hindsight, they would not
have chosen. There are both emotional and cognitive fac-
tors involved. People in the grip of a powerful emotion
tend not to reason with as much deliberateness as they
otherwise might. Strong feelings, such as those aroused
by 9/11, can also bias individuals’ perceptions, and in this
case not only by heightening sensitivity to the threat of
terrorism. The powerful desire to eliminate terrorism could
also lead to wishful thinking about the likelihood that a
proposed action against terrorism will prove successful—
including, for example, how easy it will be to win a mili-
tary campaign.43
In addition, a body of psychological research known
as prospect theory shows that people are often willing to
accept risky gambles or pay excessive costs to avoid a pos-
sibility of suffering losses. Prospect theory finds that people
generally do not view equivalent gains and losses the same
way: they attach more weight to avoiding a loss of a given
amount than to achieving a gain of the same amount.
Because of this loss aversion, people tend to be cautious
as long as they are assured of a gain, but risk-acceptant
when they are in the domain of losses.  If they expect to
lose something no matter what, they will often accept a
small chance of losing much more if they see a possibility
to thereby avoid losses altogether. Whether a situation is
framed in terms of gains or losses can therefore profoundly
affect what policy option people choose in response.44
In the 1990s, Americans basked in the glow of the
end of the Cold War and a long economic boom. This
placed them in the domain of gains and left the U.S. pub-
lic with little desire to take risks on behalf of an activist
foreign policy agenda. September 11 clearly shifted the
framing of foreign policy debates into the domain of
losses.45  The United States lost many innocent lives in
the Qaeda attack, so the question afterward naturally be-
came how to avoid further losses.
This focus on loss aversion has made the U.S. public
more willing to risk war. If the Bush administration had
to make the case for military action to change the Iraqi
regime purely in terms of possible gains for the United
States, the arguments would be much less persuasive.
Some U.S. elites have seen possible advantages in war
against Iraq, arguing it would provide greater access to
Middle East oil or could initiate a spread of democracy
across the Arab world. If these were the only arguments
for war, public opposition would be much greater than it
is. The possible gains for the United States are not nearly
as strong a motivation for war as the aversion to poten-
tially suffering further losses from a chemical or biologi-
cal 9/11.
As a corollary of loss aversion, prospect theory finds
that people tend to attach much more value to eliminat-
ing a low-probability threat than a standard, rational cal-
culation of expected utility would lead one to expect. For
example, in a hypothetical game of Russian roulette,
people would pay far more to reduce the number of bul-
lets from 1 to 0 than from 4 to 3, even though both changes
equally reduce the probability of being shot by one-sixth.46
The impetus to eliminate entirely a given source of threat,
such as Iraqi WMD, might lead people to accept a much
higher level of negative consequences than they would
otherwise, perhaps to the extent that the likely costs would
outweigh the likely benefits. In sum, by shifting the em-
phasis in foreign policy debates to possible future losses,
9/11 made Americans more willing to accept even sig-
nificant risks that might accompany military action.
Possible psychological dynamics aside, there is a sec-
ond, more obvious caveat to note in relation to the post-
9/11 shift in priorities. No matter how much value
Americans now attach to preventing future terrorist at-
tacks, it is still prudent in any given case to analyze as
realistically as possible the level of threat, the possible al-
ternatives for dealing with that threat, and the relative
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costs and benefits of all the alternatives. Although one
might feel that the country should be willing to “pay any
price, bear any burden,” as President Kennedy once stated,
if the threat is less than absolute then there are in prin-
ciple prices that would be too great to pay. If people focus
solely on the urgency of eliminating Iraqi WMD, they
might fail to evaluate the possible costs and risks that
would accompany a preventive war or whether there is
any alternative course that could lower the overall threat
of WMD terrorism with fewer potential downsides.
CONCLUSIONS
This article has examined the influence of September 11
on the shift to a U.S. policy of threatening to invade Iraq
if Saddam Hussein did not eliminate his nuclear, biologi-
cal, and chemical arms programs. The article has exam-
ined the impact of 9/11 from the perspective of political
psychology, comparing this case to well-established hy-
potheses about how people reason by analogy to certain
past cases and their putative lessons. The first part of this
conclusion summarizes the findings with respect to the
fit between theory and evidence, while the second part
discusses policy implications.
Empirical Findings and Their Implications for
Theory
In a way, it seems too soon to describe 9/11 as “history”
and a potential source of lessons. But there is also abun-
dant evidence that, soon after the attack, many issues be-
gan to be filtered through the new picture of reality created
by 9/11. While the impact of 9/11 is unusually powerful,
it is not a unique phenomenon. In fact, the role of 9/11 in
shaping the Iraq debate conforms quite closely to the pat-
tern one would expect based on past research into ana-
logical reasoning.
The literature on how foreign policymakers use les-
sons of history suggests individuals will make analogies to
recent events that strongly affected their own country and
that they may apply these analogies to other situations
based in part on superficial similarities. The Iraq debate
fits these predictions. It is precisely the fact that 9/11 hap-
pened such a short time before and affected the United
States so profoundly that made it the obvious case to rely
on in deciding what to do about other foreign policy prob-
lems like Iraq. Moreover, the inference that the lessons of
9/11 apply to Saddam reflects certain similarities that do
not alone provide a sufficient basis for predicting Iraqi
behavior. Because Osama bin Laden was evil and hated
the United States, many Americans have concluded that
Saddam is equally likely to attack the United States, since
he too is evil and hates America.
In other respects, however, the existing model of ana-
logical reasoning proves inadequate to capture fully the
impact of 9/11. The literature usually focuses on how top
Executive branch officials use lessons of history, and it
assumes analogies are primarily a cognitive device to deal
with uncertainty. All of these assumptions need to be
broadened to account for the impact of September 11.
First, many administration officials and advisors already
believed, prior to the Qaeda attack, that the United States
needed to use military force to remove Saddam from power.
The shift in U.S. policy after 9/11 thus derives more from
the attack’s impact on the thinking of Congress and the
public.
This conclusion shows that analysis of the role of psy-
chological factors needs to be connected to an under-
standing of the dynamics of domestic politics. This
connection can be made by combining analogical rea-
soning with a garbage can model of agenda setting. This
approach recognizes that some important officials were
already committed to the proposal to use force against
Saddam, but they needed a favorable window of oppor-
tunity to convince a majority of the rest of the country.
At the same time, incorporating psychological factors also
strengthens a garbage-can analysis. That model assumes
there are many competing policy entrepreneurs looking
to place their proposal at the top of the policy agenda,
but it does not predict whose proposed solution will ac-
tually be adopted when a window of opportunity opens
up. An appreciation of the psychological impact of 9/11
makes it clear, however, why a proposed preventive at-
tack on Iraq would have significant innate advantages in
the policy debate compared to other policy suggestions.
It is the only proposal that promises to eliminate the
menace that is most familiar to the country; all other pro-
posals might involve waiting to act militarily until it is
too late.
This article also shows that the analogical reasoning
approach must consider more than just how individuals
use analogies cognitively to reduce uncertainty. Septem-
ber 11 did more than change people’s images of contem-
porary reality; it also aroused very strong feelings. The
emotional impact of past events must be included in the
analysis of how people use history in making decisions. A
past case that arouses strong emotions is likely to be a
much more influential analogy than a case whose lessons
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affect individuals’ thinking in a purely abstract, cog-
nitive way.
The mixture of cognitive and emotional effects of 9/
11 has influenced more than just the definition of the
situation and preferred policy response; the lessons of 9/
11 are not just a matter of reducing uncertainty about the
21st century world. September 11 has also profoundly al-
tered the value priorities and tolerance for risk of many
Americans. Even if it could be proven objectively that
the risk of an attack originating from Saddam’s Iraq were
low, a great many Americans are no longer willing to live
with such a risk. The analogical reasoning approach thus
needs to include awareness of how a lesson of the past
can influence value tradeoffs and the costs people are
willing to pay to reduce risk. This can be done in part by
synthesizing analogical reasoning with prospect theory,
which should not be difficult since both focus on cogni-
tive processes. Prospect theory suggests that the impact
of a past event on people’s value priorities is in part a
function of whether an analogy to that event leads people
to frame a new situation in terms of possible gains or pos-
sible losses.
Even though this article shows certain ways in which
it would be useful to broaden the analogical reasoning
model, the most basic finding is that this model fits the
facts of the Iraq debate quite well. An understanding of
how people use lessons of the past still provides a useful
tool for explaining foreign policy, even when the “past”
in question is barely one year old.
Policy Implications
While it is important to learn from traumatic events and
policy failures, attempts to apply the lessons learned carry
their own perils. Reasoning by analogy to a previous case
can lead to unwise policy choices if the lesson derived
from the past case is incorrect, if the present situation
differs in important ways from the earlier case, or if reli-
ance on a particular analogy leads one to ignore other
relevant past experience. The application of lessons of 9/
11 to Iraq reflects to some extent these various pitfalls.
The most dangerous consequence has been an unwar-
ranted dismissal of deterrence.
The first potential misuse of an analogy does not di-
rectly apply in this case. The proposition that the United
States should have done more earlier to disable al Qaeda
is correct, provided that the action taken would not have
somehow led to an even worse result than 9/11.
There is a potential danger, however, if people focus
on only a single lesson of the past case they are using as
an analogy. There are other plausible lessons of 9/11, and
some have rather different implications than the first les-
son when it comes to the case of Iraq. For example, the
United States has sometimes pursued its interests in the
Middle East in ways that have created widespread anger
in the Arab world, and 9/11 showed what can happen
when terrorists can persuade other Arabs that the United
States is an enemy of Islam. If an invasion of Iraq unfolds
in such a way that it could lend credence to al Qaeda’s
propaganda, it could ease the terrorists’ efforts to find sup-
port and new recruits. To the extent an event like 9/11
teaches more than one lesson and these lessons have con-
tradictory policy implications, relying on just one lesson,
however correct, while neglecting the others could have
undesirable consequences.
The second and third risks in analogical reasoning
apply more clearly in the Iraq case however. There are
significant differences between Iraq and al Qaeda, and
evidence from cases that are actually more similar to the
Iraq of 2002 suggests Saddam is not as likely to initiate a
sudden attack as the 9/11 analogy has led people to be-
lieve. Saddam is the ruler of a state, not the leader of a
terrorist network; he is motivated by the desire for power,
not by a fanatical ideology; and, unlike al Qaeda, he is
tied to a piece of territory, so he cannot slip away and set
up a new base elsewhere if he provokes an attack on his
existing base of operations. Arguments about Iraq in 2002
are remarkably similar to recurring warnings of a possible
Soviet surprise attack during the Cold War, to statements
of alarm about what a supposedly crazy Mao might do with
nuclear weapons, to predictions that North Korea would
prove too irrational to be deterred, and to fears expressed
about what Saddam himself might do during the Gulf War.
Yet in none of these prior situations did a dictatorial and
unpredictable leader ever attack the United States. Fi-
nally, 9/11 holds lessons for other states, not just America.
By demonstrating the U.S. resolve and ability to remove
regimes that harbor or sponsor terrorism, 9/11 should have
strengthened the deterrent message to governments that
would contemplate aiding terrorists.
The case for preventive war seemingly boils down to
the argument that Saddam is a threat because he is evil.
But being evil is not in and of itself diagnostic. Saddam
has used CW and mandated many acts of brutality to keep
his own population terrorized. These facts should arouse
our moral outrage, but they do not justify a prediction that
Saddam will initiate a WMD attack on the United States
or a U.S. ally. Saddam only uses weapons and tactics of
terror against those who are too weak to defeat him, and
he uses them, not out of pure sadism, but instrumentally
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to maintain or expand his power. Iraqi WMD use is much
less likely against a strong state that could respond by
eliminating Saddam’s regime.
In sum, those who seek to write the epitaphs for de-
terrence and containment do so prematurely. Analysis of
the relevant logic and evidence shows that rogue states
are not necessarily beyond the reach of deterrence, even
in a world where they might be tempted to use terrorist
networks to conduct a sneak attack. Those who sweep-
ingly dismiss deterrence and containment as relics of the
20th century thus do a disservice to U.S. national secu-
rity. They make it less likely that the United States would
consider using these tools when they might be effective,
even though these tools might help the country avoid
some of the costs and risks associated with war.
None of this guarantees that deterrence will work.
Deterrence can always fail, and the heightened aware-
ness of the risks after 9/11 makes it likely that the option
of preventive military action will also get serious consid-
eration for some time to come. But however much the
world has changed, the requirements for making sound
policy decisions have not. Inferences drawn from a single
past event cannot substitute for proper policy analysis—
no matter how recent and traumatic the event, and no
matter how compelling the lessons of that event feel in
its aftermath. The lessons of 9/11 must surely be taken
into consideration. Other past cases are also relevant to
understanding the situation today, however, and they too
should be kept in mind. Furthermore, regardless of how
urgent the case for action appears, it is still important to
estimate as realistically as possible the likely costs and risks
of taking action as well as those of failing to act. Finally,
before embarking on a preventive war, it is also still nec-
essary to identify the possible alternatives and weigh their
pros and cons against those of war. Especially with respect
to efforts to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, the United States should not neglect the traditional
tools of nonproliferation, as these can still play a useful
role.
Some pre-emptive attacks might nevertheless be nec-
essary, but if they are truly necessary then they are likely
to emerge as the best option even after a sober and thor-
ough analysis. Unless the American people and their lead-
ers keep in mind how human psychology works, and
recognize that the lessons of a traumatic event like 9/11
will feel compelling even in cases where they do not fit
the facts, the United States is likely to take some military
actions that are not necessary and possibly even counter-
productive.
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